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Abstract
Research in the area of automatic speaker verification
(ASV) has advanced enough for the industry to start us-
ing ASV systems in practical applications. However, as it
was also shown for fingerprints, face, and other verification
systems, ASV systems are highly vulnerable to spoofing or
presentation attacks, limiting their wide practical deploy-
ment. Therefore, to protect against such attacks, effective
anti-spoofing detection techniques, more formally known as
presentation attack detection (PAD) systems, need to be de-
veloped. These techniques should be then seamlessly in-
tegrated into existing ASV systems for practical all-in-one
solutions. In this paper, we focus on the integration of PAD
and ASV systems. We consider the state of the art i-vector
and ISV-based ASV systems and demonstrate the effect of
score-based integration with a PAD system on the verifica-
tion and attack detection accuracies. In our experiments,
we rely on AVspoof database that contains realistic pre-
sentation attacks, which are considered by the industry to
be the threat to practical ASV systems. Experimental re-
sults show a significantly increased resistance of the joint
ASV-PAD system to the attacks at the expense of slightly
degraded performance for scenarios without spoofing at-
tacks. Also, an important contribution of the paper is an
open source and an online-based implementations of the
separate and joint ASV-PAD systems.
1. Introduction
Similar to fingerprint sensors and face recognition sys-
tems, automatic speaker verification (ASV) systems were
shown to be highly vulnerable to spoofing or presenta-
tion attacks [9]. The ease with which an ASV system
can be spoofed motivated researchers into developing anti-
spoofing detection mechanisms, i.e., presentation attack de-
tection (PAD) systems, that can accurately and efficiently
distinguish between genuine speech and presentation at-
tacks. Several approaches have been proposed recently,
mostly focusing on the feature extraction component of
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Figure 1: Possible attacks places in a typical ASV system.
PAD systems. A survey by Wu et al. [14] provides a com-
prehensive overview of the presentation attacks and the cur-
rently available PAD methods. Most of the methods use fea-
tures based on the audio spectrogram in combination with a
classifier, e.g., based on Gaussian mixture models (GMM),
or a learning network.
However, developing a presentation attack detection
method is not enough for practical use. Such PAD system
should be seamlessly and effectively integrated with an ex-
isting ASV system. The goal for the resulted joint system is
to be resistant to presentation attacks just like its PAD com-
ponent and, in the same time, have the same verification
accuracy as its ASV component.
In this paper, we integrate speaker verification and pre-
sentation attack detection systems via learning-based score
fusion, as per approach originally proposed in [2] for face
recognition systems. This approach allows to separate gen-
uine data of the valid users, who are trying to be verified
by the system, from both presentation attacks and genuine
data of the non-valid users or so-called zero-impostors. For
an attack detection component of the joint ASV-PAD sys-
tem, we consider two different approaches: an extension of
the LBP-based method [1], which uses histograms of lo-
cal binary patterns (LBP) computed from an audio spectro-
gram as features for a logistic regression classifier, and an
approach that uses MFCC features with GMM-based clas-
sifier. For ASV system, we adopt verification approaches
based on ISV modeling [13] and i-vectors [5].
To demonstrate the feasibility of this integration ap-
proach in the context of speech biometrics and to ensure
reproducibility of the results, we have implemented PAD,
ASV, and joint ASV-PAD systems as open source. We
provide two types of implementations: a more traditional
stand-alone downloadable package1 (LBP-based PAD, i-
vector based ASV, and joint ASV-PAD systems), for which
database need to be provided in order to compute results,
and a web-based implementation (LBP- and MFCC-based
PAD, ISV-based ASV, and joint systems) based on the open
source BEAT platform2, which, inline with the recent trend
of open source web-based platforms such as Google’s Ten-
sorFlow3, allows to run, evaluate, and create biometric ex-
periments using several comprehensive databases provided
internally in BEAT.
Given the complexity of a practical ASV system, sev-
eral different modules of the system are prone to attacks, as
illustrated by Figure 1. Depending on the usage scenario,
two of the most vulnerable places for spoofing attacks in an
ASV system are marked by ‘A1’ (aka ‘physical access’ as
defined in [15] or presentation attacks) and ‘A2’ (aka ‘log-
ical access’ attacks as defined in [15]) in the figure. Since
generating ‘logical access’ attacks is relatively easier, ini-
tially available databases and first research results focused
mostly on this type of attacks.
In this paper, we focus on presentation attacks, because
they are more realistic in practical scenarios and are consid-
ered to be a serious threat by the industry, as it is reflected in
the ISO standard DIS 30107-1 [6]. Presentation attacks as-
sume that either a stolen set of user’s samples or an automat-
ically generated set of samples is replayed to a microphone
of an attacked ASV system with an attempt to mimic the
genuine registered user. AVspoof5 database [9] is the first
challenging database that contains a comprehensive set of
presentation attacks, including, (i) the direct replay attacks
when a genuine data is played back using a laptop and two
phones (Samsung Galaxy S4 and iPhone 3G), (ii) synthe-
sized speech replayed with a laptop, and (iii) an attack data,
generated using a voice conversion algorithm, replayed with
a laptop.
Therefore, this paper has the following main contribu-
tions:
• Integration of PAD and ASV systems into one joint
ASV-PAD system based on score fusion;
• Open source implementations of two PAD and two
ASV state of the art systems;
• An extensive and reproducible evaluation of the con-
sidered systems on the realistic presentation attacks of
AVspoof database.
1Source code: https://pypi.python.org/pypi/bob.paper.btas j2016
2https://www.beat-eu.org/platform/
3https://www.tensorflow.org/
2. Related work
The research on presentation attack detection is far from
being matured, especially, if compared to the significant ad-
vances in speech analysis and speaker verification. Most of
the available work in speech anti-spoofing focuses on syn-
thetic attacks, such as voice conversion, speech synthesis,
and artificial signals [14], which are assumed to be fed into
a verification system directly bypassing its microphone (in-
dicated by ‘A2’ in Figure 1), hence, they are coined by the
authors as ‘logical access’ attacks [15]. This type of attacks
constitute ASVspoof4 database, which was made recently
available for Interspeech anti-spoofing challenge [15]. The
most practical replay attacks (indicated by ‘A1’ in Figure 1),
which are formally defined as presentation attacks by ISO
standardization committee [6], received considerably less
attention, since, until now, there was no dataset with such
attacks. That is why AVspoof5 is of great interest, because
it is the first database that contains several types of replay
attacks.
A survey by Wu et al. [14] provides a comprehensive
overview of the spoofing attacks and the currently avail-
able attack detection methods. These methods use features
mostly based on the audio spectrogram, such as spectral-
and cepstral-based features [12], phase-based features [4],
the combination of amplitude and phase features [10], and
audio quality based features [7]. Also, a higher computa-
tional layer can be added, for instance, Alegre et al. [1] pro-
posed to use histograms of Local Binary Patterns (LBP),
which can be computed directly from a set of pre-selected
spectral, phase-based, or other features. Most of these fea-
tures are used successfully in speaker verification systems
already, so, naturally, they are first to be proposed for PAD
systems as well.
Besides determining ‘good features for detecting presen-
tation attacks’, it is also important to correctly classify the
computed feature vectors as belonging to real or spoofed
data. Choosing a reliable classifier is especially important
given a possibly unpredictable nature of attacks in a prac-
tical system, since it is unknown what kind of attack the
perpetrator may use when spoofing the verification system.
The most common approach to classification is to use one
of the well-known classifiers, which is usually pre-trained
on the examples of both real and spoofed data.
Different methods use different classifiers but the most
common choices include logistic regression, support vec-
tor machine (SVM), and Gaussian mixture model (GMM)
classifiers. The benchmarking study on ‘logical access’ at-
tacks [11] finds GMMs to be more successful compared to
two-class SVM (combined with an LBP-based feature ex-
traction from [1]) in detecting synthetic spoofing attacks.
4http://datashare.is.ed.ac.uk/handle/10283/853
5https://www.idiap.ch/dataset/avspoof
Figure 2: AVspoof database recording setup.
In this paper, we adopt versions of two popular ap-
proaches for presentation attack detection: MFCC based
features with two GMM-based classifiers (one for real data
and one for attacks) and LBP-histograms computed on
MFCC features with logistic regression classifier.
The research on automatic speaker verification is more
established with regular competitions conducted by Na-
tional Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) since
19966. Many techniques have been proposed with the most
notable systems based on GMM, inter-session variability
(ISV) modeling [13], joint factor analysis (JFA) [8], and
i-vectors [5].
In this paper, we consider ASV systems based on ISV
(BEAT-based implementation2) and i-vectors (stand-alone
implementation1).
3. Experimental setup
One of the major factor constraining the development of
effective presentation attack detection methods for speech
is the lack of standard databases with a set of real (genuine)
speech samples and a large variety of presentation attacks.
To our knowledge, the most comprehensive database con-
taining spoofing attacks is AVspoof5 [9]. In this section, we
describe this dataset and discuss how it is used to evaluate
ASV and PAD systems.
3.1. Presentation attack database
AVspoof database contains real (genuine) speech sam-
ples from 44 participants (31 males and 13 females)
recorded over the period of two months in four sessions,
each scheduled several days apart in different setups and
environmental conditions such as background noises. The
first session was recorded in the most controlled conditions.
Speech samples were recorded using three devices: lap-
top using microphone AT2020USB+, Samsung Galaxy S4
phone, and iPhone 3GS (see recording setup in Figure 2).
The following type of recordings were made:
• Reading part: 10 or 40 pre-defined sentences are read
by participants.
6http://www.nist.gov/itl/iad/mig/sre.cfm
• Pass-phrases part: 5 short prompts are read by partici-
pants.
• Free speech part: participants speak freely about any
topic for 3 to 10 minutes.
When generating presentation attacks, the assumption is
that a verification system is installed on a laptop (with an in-
ternal built-in microphone) and an attacker is trying to gain
access to this system by playing back to it a pre-recorded
genuine data or an automatically generated synthetic data
using some playback device. In AVspoof database, presen-
tation attacks consist of (i) direct replay attacks when a gen-
uine data is played back using a laptop with internal speak-
ers, a laptop with external high quality speakers, Samsung
Galaxy S4 phone, and iPhone 3G, (ii) synthesized speech
replayed with a laptop, and (iii) converted voice attacks re-
played with a laptop.
The data in AVspoof database is split into three non-
overlapping subsets: training (real and spoofed samples
from 4 male and 10 female participants), development or
Dev (real and spoofed samples from 4 male and 10 female
participants), and test or Test (real and spoofed samples
from 5 male and 11 female participants).
3.2. Evaluation protocol
The training subset of AVspoof database is used for
training a PAD or an ASV system. The development set
is used for determining hyper-parameters of the system, in-
cluding an equal error rate threshold. For that purpose, the
system is run on each of the samples from development set,
producing scores indicating how similar these samples are
to the previously built models (real or spoofed for PAD and
client models for ASV). Once such scores for all samples
are obtained, knowing the correct correspondence (whether
it is spoofed or real data for PAD and a client ID for ASV),
we can split the scores in two sets ensuring that false ac-
ceptance rate (FAR) and false reject rate (FRR) are equal.
This equal rate is usually called equal error rate (EER). The
median value of the split scores is the EER threshold, since
this is the specific value of the system that leads to EER.
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Figure 3: An ASV-PAD joint system based on score fusion.
Applying the EER threshold obtained from Dev set to the
scores of the Test set leads to another pair of FAR and FRR
values, which are the measures of the system’s performance
in uncontrolled evaluation settings. In a perfectly consistent
PAD or ASV system, FAR and FRR values on the Test set
would be the same as FAR and FRR values obtained for Dev
set. Hence, to summarize the performance of the system in
one value, a half total error rate (HTER) is computed as a
mean of FAR and FRR. The HTER is then used as an overall
measure of the PAD or ASV system’s performance.
For more details on the evaluation methodologies for
PAD and ASV systems, please refer to [2].
4. Integrating ASV and PAD
As described in Section 2, multiple presentation attack
detection systems have been proposed to detect whether a
given speech sample is real or spoofed. However, the pur-
pose of a PAD system is to work in tandem with a verifica-
tion system, so that the joint system can effectively separate
the genuine data from both zero-effort impostors (genuine
data but incorrect identity) and spoofed attacks (spoofed
data for the correct identity).
Typically, a PAD system is sequentially combined with
an ASV system, so that spoofed data is filtered out first and
only non-spoofed data is passed along for the verification.
Such filtering decision can occur at different components of
the system (at feature extraction, training, post-processing,
etc.), however, in this paper, we combine or fuse these sys-
tems at the score level, using a parallel scheme, as is illus-
trated in Figure 3. Basically, the scores from each system
are taken and transformed into one set of scores, which are
used to separate real samples that belong to the correct iden-
tity from zero-impostor and presentation attacks. This clas-
sification task can be performed using different approaches,
but we adopt a logistic regression classifier, which results in
a straight line separation, as illustrated by the scatter plot in
Figure 5a. The classifier is pre-trained on the scores from
both ASV and PAD systems, which are computed on the
training set of AVspoof dataset.
Considering a score level fusion, it is then important to
perform a thorough evaluation of the combined/fused sys-
tem to understand how incorporating anti-spoofing mea-
sures affects verification accuracy for both real and spoofed
Table 1: MFCC and LBP-based PAD systems performance.
Systems EER FAR FRR HTER
(%) (%) (%) (%)
MFCC-based 5.66 5.61 8.14 6.88
LBP-based 2.02 1.35 2.96 2.15
data. In this paper, we adopt an evaluation methodology
specifically designed for performance assessment of fusion
system proposed in [2] for face recognition.
To help ASV systems resist spoofing attacks, we con-
sider two presentation attacks detection systems: (i) based
on histograms of LBP8,1 features with logistic regression
classifier, which is an extension of the system presented
in [1], and (ii) based on MFCC features with GMM-based
classifier, which was evaluated in [11] on ‘logical access’
attacks of ASVspoof4 database.
In MFCC-based PAD system, 19 MFCCs with deltas and
double-deltas were used as features. Two GMMs are built
for real data and spoof attacks and the evaluation score is
computed as a log-likelihood between these two GMMs. In
LBP-based PAD system, spectrogram (filtered with 40 Mel-
scaled filters, log values) is split in two lower and higher
bands. For each band, a histogram of regularLBP8,1 values
is computed and used as the feature. Logistic regression
classifier is used to train and evaluate the features.
Table 1 presents the error rates for the considered
PAD systems against the presentation attacks of AVspoof
database. To have a clearer understanding about the perfor-
mance of the selected PAD systems, we also plot histograms
of score distributions for real data and attacks in both Dev
and Test sets. Figure 4 shows these score distributions for
ASV and the best PAD system (LBP-based). The detailed
results for MFCC-based system implemented in the BEAT
platform7 can be examined and the detection error tradeoff
(DET) curves of both PAD systems can be compared using
the online report8 as well.
5. Experiment results and discussion
In this section, we demonstrate the vulnerability of
stand-alone speaker verification and the improved resis-
tance to spoofing when it is integrated with a PAD sys-
tem. In addition to two PAD systems presented in Sec-
tion 4, we consider two ASV systems based on ISV mod-
eling [13] (implemented in BEAT platform extending the
system in [3]) and i-vectors [5] (stand-alone open source
implementation), which are the state of the art speaker veri-
fication systems able to effectively deal with intra-class and
inter-class variability. In these systems, voice activity detec-
7https://www.beat-eu.org/platform/reports/1004707911/
8https://www.beat-eu.org/platform/reports/965188923/
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Figure 4: Histogram distributions for i-vector based ASV system in ‘licit’ and ’spoof’ scenario, and LBP-based PAD system.
10 0 10 20 30 40 50 60
ASV scores
50
40
30
20
10
0
10
20
30
40
P
A
D
 s
co
re
s
Impostors
Spoofing attacks
Genuine accesses
decision boundary
(a) Scatter plot, Test set
-30.0 -25.0 -20.0 -15.0 -10.0 -5.0 0.0 5.0 10.0 15.0
Verification scores
0.0
0.05
0.1
0.15
0.2
0.25
N
or
m
al
iz
ed
C
ou
nt
threshold
Impostors
Genuine Users
Spoofing Attacks
0
20
40
60
80
100
S
FA
R
(%
)
1.2%
(b) Histogram distribution, Test set
0.01 0.02 0.05 0.1 0.2 0.5 1 2 5 10 20 40 60 80 90 95 98 99
False Acceptance Rate (%)
0.01
0.02
0.05
0.1
0.2
0.5
1
2
5
10
20
40
60
80
90
95
98
99
Fa
ls
e
R
ej
ec
tio
n
R
at
e
(%
)
FAR=11.24%
SFAR=
1.21%
Licit scenario
Spoof scenario
FRR = 12.11%
(c) DET curves, Test set
Figure 5: A scatter plot, histogram distributions, and DET curves for joint i-vector and LBP-based system.
tion is based on the modulation of the energy around 4Hz,
the features include 19 MFCCs and energy, with their first
and second derivatives, and modeling was performed with
256 Gaussian components. In i-vectors based system, the
dimension of i-vectors is 100.
5.1. Vulnerability of ASV to presentation attacks
Table 2 demonstrates how i-vectors (first row) and ISV-
based (third row) ASV systems perform in two different
scenarios: (i) when there are no attacks present (zero-
impostors only), referred in the paper as ‘licit’ scenario, and
(ii) when the system is being spoofed with presentation at-
tacks, referred as ‘spoof’ scenario. Histograms of score dis-
tribution in Figure 4b also illustrate the effect of attacks on
i-vectors based ASV system in ‘spoof’ scenario, compared
to ‘licit’ scenario in Figure 4a. For more details on ASV-
based implementation, please refer to the implementations
available online for ‘licit’9 and for ‘spoof’10 scenarios.
From Table 2, it can be noted that both ASV systems per-
form relatively well under ‘licit’ scenario with ISV-based
system showing lower HTER of 4.19%. However, when a
spoofed data is introduced, without a PAD system in place,
the spoofing false acceptance rate (SFAR) significantly in-
creases reaching 97.75% for ISV-based and 94.92% for i-
vectors based systems, which leads to an HTERs of 50.54%
9https://www.beat-eu.org/platform/reports/2044414884/
10https://www.beat-eu.org/platform/reports/1686711283/
and 51.61%, respectively. It means that a typical verifica-
tion system is not able to correctly distinguish presentation
attacks from genuine data.
5.2. Joint operation of ASV and PAD
As presented in Section 4, in score-based fusion of PAD
and ASV systems, we make a decision about each speech
sample using the scores from both PAD and ASV. The re-
sulted joint system can effectively distinguish genuine data
from presentation attacks, as demonstrated in Figure 5b for
ASV based on i-vector integrated with LBP-based PAD
system. Integration of PAD system effectively reduced
SFAR from 94.92% that stand-alone i-vector ASV had un-
der ‘spoof’ scenario to SFAR of 1.21%, at the expense
of slightly degraded verification performance in ‘licit’ sce-
nario, when HTER increases from 8.55% to 11.67%, once
PAD is added (see Table 2 and Figure 5c).
From the Table 2 and BEAT comparative online report11
for ISV-based ASV with LBP-based PAD and ISV-based
ASV with MFCC-based PAD systems, it is clear that they
are less effective in filtering out presentation attacks with
HTER values 12.84% and 23.39% respectively. However,
it is clear that a joint system that fuses the outcomes of
both PAD and ASV systems is more resistant to attacks in
a ‘spoof’ scenario, while still performing well in the ‘licit’
scenario compared to a stand-alone ASV system.
11https://www.beat-eu.org/platform/reports/1229989776/
Table 2: Performance of i-vector and ISV-based verification systems individually and jointly with LBP and MFCC-based
PAD systems on real and spoofed samples from Test set of AVspoof database.
System Zero-impostors only Spoofed attacks only
FAR (%) FRR (%) HTER (%) SFAR (%) SFRR (%) HTER (%)
i-vector based ASV 8.80 8.30 8.55 94.92 8.30 51.61
joint ASV-PAD: i-vector and LBP-based 11.24 12.11 11.67 1.21 12.10 6.66
ISV-based ASV 5.23 3.14 4.19 97.75 3.14 50.54
joint ASV-PAD: ISV and LBP-based 8.34 8.16 8.25 12.84 19.52 16.18
joint ASV-PAD: ISV and MFCC-based 5.60 8.31 6.95 23.39 30.48 26.94
6. Conclusion
In this paper, we consider score-based integration of sev-
eral PAD and ASV systems. Experimental results show a
significantly increased resistance of joined ASV-PAD sys-
tems to presentation attacks of AVspoof database (e.g., false
acceptance rate for the attacks drops from above 90% for
stand-alone ASV to less than 2% for an i-vector and LBP-
histograms based ASV-PAD joint system) at the expense of
slightly degraded performance for the scenario with no at-
tacks. An important contribution is also an open source and
online-based implementations of the considered ASV, PAD,
and joint ASV-PAD systems.
In the future work, we will consider a cascading scheme
for score fusion and compare it with the presented parallel
scheme. We will also focus on the development of novel
presentation attack databases and on exploring multi-modal
systems, when both ASV and PAD systems of different
modalities, e.g., speech and image, are integrated to im-
prove the performance in both ‘licit’ and ‘spoof’ scenarios.
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